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Abstract: 
 
Shadow economy is harmful to the whole official economy. It distorts competition and stock 
prices, it worsens income distribution and is an obstacle for entrepreneurship and economic 
growth.  
 
There are many reasons causing shadow economy. One of them is earnings management. A 
lot of research has been made on earnings management. In this paper Jones (1991) model 
will be used to examine the phenomenon of earnings management in the Greek construction 
industry. The findings are: first in the Greek construction sector discretionary accruals in 
practice affect negligibly the percentage of shadow economy in GDP, second in the Greek 
construction sector discretionary accruals (showing lower profits) increase in periods of 
higher capital tax rate, third in the Greek construction sector usually large companies resort 
to earnings management more than the small ones.  
 
Hence, Jones (1991) model shows the way for further investigation on tax avoidance. It 
should be noted however that shadow economy is a very complicated topic and is not only a 
matter of just earnings management. The contribution of this paper is that it uses Jones 
(1991) model to spot tax evading companies and triggers further research.  
 
Besides, the findings of this paper indicate the need for the global adoption of the 
international accounting and auditing standards. Cultural differentials across countries, 
which hinder this adoption, must be overcome. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Shadow Economy is harmful to the Economy. At first if affects share prices and 
distorts normal5change in stock prices. Indeed, based on Weber (2006), analysts’ 
systematic errors proxy for similar errors made by investors concerning book-tax 
differences for future earnings lead to mispricing, which destroys transparency and 
is off-putting to the would-be investors6. Further, corporate tax avoidance is 
positively related with firm-specific stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2011). 
Besides, Georgiou (2013) asserts that shadow economy pushes up share prices. 
 
There are countries in which a lot of firms are not listed in the stock market, and 
where tax evasion happens regularly. In these countries the method of earnings 
management takes place quite many times. Further, earnings management occurs to 
show that a company has reached its targets so as to increase its share price (Bartov 
et al., 2002). It should be also mentioned that firms aim to remain competitive7in the 
market and to meet their obligations to third parties (Cormier and Magnan, 1996) to 
avoid bankruptcy, they sometimes hide various costs, in order to avoid an increase in 
the interest rates of their loans8. 
 
Besides, shadow economy distorts competition. In fact, Armbrecht and Carlback 
(2011), found that it is very difficult not only to survive as a law-abiding firm, but 
also that the unfair competition (due to shadow economy) affects the whole sector’s 
progress and development. In other words, shadow economy is an obstacle to the 
competition. Firms in a globalized environment resorted to earnings management in 
order to attract would-be investors9 (Vanasco, 1998). 
 
Apart from that shadow economy affects inflation and taxation. According to 
Mazhar and Méon (2012) in a sample of developed and developing countries during 
the period 1999-2007, a positive relation is found between inflation and the size of 
the shadow economy. Further, tax burden tends to increase shadow economy 
(Schneider, 2012). 
 
Entrepreneurship is also affected by shadow economy. According to Estrin and 
Mickiewicz (2012) shadow economy hinders entrepreneurial entry10. In fact, 
freedom to enter the market is one of the fundamental rules for the creation of 
perfect competition (Liebhafsky, 1968). Further, shadow economy is an obstacle to 
                                                          
5 Changes that follow only market conditions without other interferences. 
6 In this way economic growth is hindered. 
7 This distorts perfect competition conditions as well as transparency 
8 This lack of transparency distorts fair competition and is an obstacle for economic growth 
(Georgiou, 2013a). 
9 This lack of transparency distorts fair competition and is an obstacle for economic growth 
(Georgiou, 2013a). 
10 This is an obstacle to perfect competition (Liebhafsky, 1968). 
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entrepreneurial activity (Georgiou, 2013a) causing in this way a delay in economic 
growth. 
 
Shadow economy worsens income distribution. Since, tax avoidance reduces the 
total tax revenues, then “tax burden” on “honest” tax payers are expected to go up11 
in order to cover the tax revenue generated gap. Consequently, this tax burden will 
deteriorate income distribution (Georgiou, 2013c). 
 
Today shadow economy increases with GDP growth (Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
They assert that the main causes of the increase in shadow economy are the 
increased taxation, the rise in social security contributions, the increased regulation 
in the official economy, the declining loyalty towards public institutions and finally 
a declining tax morale. However, according to Georgiou (2016) shadow economy 
per head at constant prices remains fixed over time. Perhaps this difference in the 
conclusion is attributed to the different time span in which the research was made, or 
it might be since recently various imposed market regulations have restricted shadow 
economy. 
 
Although shadow economy harms the official economy, countries do not seem to be 
willing to adopt international accounting standards and international standards of 
auditing to eliminate shadow economy. According to the work of ICAEW (2010) the 
following factors determine the quality of national environments and their effect on 
audited financial statements: political, economic and business environment; legal 
framework; education; culture; perceptions of audit. These factors hinder the 
adoption as well as the international harmonization in international reporting 
standards as well as international standards of auditing and accounting. Besides, the 
adoption of the above international standards requires national convergence. It 
would be of interest to recall Leuz (2010), who concludes: ‘the role of accounting 
standards is much more limited in bringing about global reporting convergence than 
often thought. Moving to a single set of accounting standards is not enough to 
produce comparability of reporting and disclosure practices, even if standards were 
strictly enforced in all countries. […] true convergence in reporting practices seems 
far away and would require a much broader convergence of countries institutional 
frameworks, which is unrealistic soon (and probably not even desirable). 
 
2. The Method of Earnings Management 
 
It is worldwide claimed that the main reason of shadow economy is tax evasion. A 
comprehensive literature can be found in Schneider and Enste (2000).  This global 
phenomenon of shadow economy appears in many types. One of them and very 
                                                          
11 In other words, effective tax rate will increase in order to compensate for the reduction of 
tax revenues, which is created by tax evasion. 
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common is called earning management, used by companies in order to pay less taxes 
(Guenther, 1994). This is done mainly by large companies12.  
 
Earnings management has been analyzed by many economists DeAngelo (1986), 
Jones (1991), Cahan (1992) and showed a considerable increase during the period 
1997-2002 (Cohen et al., 2004). The rapid technological progress as well as the fast 
change in capital markets are two important reasons that made accounting system 
very complicated.  
 
According to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973) researches 
concluded that international auditing standards are one important determinant factor 
to reduce tax evasion. Consequently, auditing is required to guarantee that 
company’s income statements become trustworthy. Further, Kerr (2015) asserts that 
countries, where companies have greater levels of transparency, experience lower 
levels of tax avoidance.  
 
That is why international accounting standards as well as international auditing 
standards must be adopted. In this way, transparency will be increased. 
Consequently, an increased transparency gives better, trustworthy and reliable 
information to the would-be investors. Thus, international investments will be 
increased ending up with economic growth (Georgiou, 2013a). Besides, world 
history has shown that countries, having robust accounting systems and high levels 
of transparency, enjoy economic growth and political stability (Georgiou et al., 
2015; Rogdaki et al., 2011; Bekiaris et al., 2011; Tsamis and Liapis, 2014; Rovolis 
et al., 2014). 
 
3. The Greek Construction Sector 
 
Since economic crisis has hit mainly southern EU countries (EIOPA, 2015) and 
since it is claimed that tax evasion is stronger during crisis (Brondolo, 2009), it will 
be of interest to examine the phenomenon of earnings management in a Greek 
sector, the construction sector. It should be noted that construction sector is chosen 
because it used to be a very dynamic sector of the Greek economy. The company 
names are kept secret and only econometric and statistical findings will be discussed. 
 
Economic crisis has hit Greek firms (EIOPA, 2015) and the construction sector. 
Tax evasion is higher during crisis (Brondolo, 2009). In the year 2008 in many 
countries a tax revenue loss started to climb reaching the 0,8% of GDP and is 
                                                          
12 It is made mainly by large companies that have well organized accounting department. 
Hence, large companies, compared to the small and medium firms (smes), are in a position 
to show a better picture in order to attract investors in the future. Consequently, there is a 
distortion in market competition. Besides it should not be ignored that smes face also two 
serious problems (shortage of experienced personnel and difficult access to finance) (Hamill, 
1997). 
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increasing during 2009. This problem is more severe in emerging economies. On 
the contrary, in the EU13, regarding the companies listed in the stock exchange, 
(Filip and Raffournier, 2015) claim that earnings management has declined 
considerably during the 2008-200914.  
 
According to the Foundation for Economic & Industrial Research15 (2015) the value 
added of the construction sector (including the related cooperating firms) was in the 
year 2006 the 11% of Greek GDP. The recent financial crisis reduced this 
percentage to 4% of GDP (2013). Furthermore, the share of employment in this 
sector to the total employment dropped from 13% (2008) to 8,7% (2013). It should 
be also noted that real estate sector was also hit by the crisis, causing a considerable 
drop in house prices as well as a stop in house selling. Hence, according to the data 
of Bank of Greece (2015) the index of production in construction sector (at fixed 
prices) has declined from 141,2 (2009) to 41,4 (2014). 
 
4. The Jones Model 
 
In this chapter Jones (1991) model will be used to estimate accruals of the Greek 
construction sector (Section 4.1). After that, in section 4.2 using these estimated 
accruals of the above sector as a new economic variable, econometric models will be 
applied to relate these accruals with: shadow economy (section 4.2.a), with capital 
tax rate (section 4.2.b), and finally, in (section 4.2.c) it will be shown that earnings 
management is larger in big companies of the Greek construction sector. 
 
4.1 Estimation of accruals 
 
At first one can estimate discretionary accruals, which will be estimated by model 
(1). 
 
TACRit = c0 + c1DSalesit + c2FAit + errorit                                                            (1) 
 
The above model is based on the method of Jones (1991)16. Variable TACR equals 
net profits – operating cash flows. Variable DSalest is equal tothe annual change in 
sales (Salest– Salest-1). Variable FA equals Total Fixed Assets. From model (1) the 
produced and estimated residuals are according to Jones (1991) the discretionary 
accruals, which will be named (DA). All data are in millions €. 
 
                                                          
13 In EU the governance effectiveness is higher and shadow economy is better controlled. 
14 If the international accounting and auditing standards will be adopted, then earnings 
managementis expected to be further reduced. 
15 IOBE 
16 Jones (1991) model is not the only one to estimate tax avoidance by means of earnings 
management. There are many others such as: (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan,  1995) and 
Kothari et al. (2005),  but they are more complicated, while Jones (1991) model is handy. 
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It should be noted that the estimated (DA) is either negative, or positive (Jones, 
1991). If it is a positive number, then it is an income increasing accrual. A possible 
reason for this can be the attempt of a CEO to persuade the others before he (she) 
retires that he (she) is a person of good fame. In this case, higher profits are shown 
(Godfrey et al., 2003; Reitenga and Tearny, 2003).  If it is a negative number, then 
this could be due to an income decreasing accrual either for tax evasion purposes 
(Guenther, 1994), or according to (D’Souza, Jacob and Ramesh, 2001) when some 
companies, through the method of earnings management, show lower levels of 
profits when they are in the process of negotiating labor contracts.  
 
The data of our analysis cover 12 companies17 of the Greek construction sector 
during the period 2008-2014 and are taken from income statements as well as 
balance sheets. The produced unbalanced sample of panel data has in total 70 
observations.  
 
Table 1. The Results of Regression (1) 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant 3,180 0,0267 
DSales -0,068 0,0174 
FA -0,203 0,0000 
R2 0,472 … 
Adjusted R2 0,456 … 
S.E. of  regression 17,956 … 
F-statistic 29,936 0,0000 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1,831 … 
 
At 5% level of significance dU = 1,64127. Hence there is not serial correlation in 
model (1), since dU< DW <2. The distribution of the residuals of (1) is normal at 5% 
level of significance. 
 
4.2 Relating accruals with shadow economy and capital tax rate 
 
At first, one can estimate the impact of the above estimated accruals[DA]on the 
Greek shadow economy as a percentage of GDP [sh_ec].  
 
The research hypothesis is: 
 
H0: Discretionary Accruals of Greek construction Sector do not affect Greek 
Shadow Economy as a percentage of GDP. 
                                                          
17 The names of these companies are for obvious reasons kept secret and only the 
conclusions are mentioned. 
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Histogram 1. The Distribution of Residuals of (1) 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 1 70
Observations 70
Mean      -2.154194
Median  -1.887093
Maximum  41.90825
Minimum -38.26427
Std. Dev.   17.56038
Skewness   0.279386
Kurtosis   2.861386
Jarque-Bera  0.966702
Probability  0.616713
 
 
 
The model is 
 
sh_ecit = c0 + c1DAit +errorit                                                                                    (2) 
 
Variable sh_ec denotes the level of shadow economy in each country as a 
percentage of official GDP, taken from Schneider et al., (2010) and  Schneider, 
(2013). The data cover the same as above 12 companies of the Greek construction 
sector during the period 2008-2013. The produced sample has 69 observations in 
total in model (2). 
 
Table 2. The results of Regression (2) 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant 24,439 0,000 
DA -6,160E-17 0,011 
R2 1,000 … 
Adjusted R2 1,000 … 
S.E. ofregression 0,000 … 
F-statistic 4,550E+30 0,000 
Durbin-Watsonstatistic 1,945 … 
 
It should be noted that at 5% dU=1,63898. Hence there is not serial correlation in 
model (2), since dU< DW <2. The distribution of the residuals of (2) is normal at 5% 
level of significance. 
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Histogram 2. The Distribution of Residuals of (2) 
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Std. Dev.   1.29e-15
Skewness  -0.121498
Kurtosis   4.063457
Jarque-Bera  3.421216
Probability  0.180756
 
 
 
Table 3. Robustness Tests of (2)18 
TESTS Panel EGLS (Cross-
section weights) 
Critical values 
(at 95%) 
Heteroskedasticity(*) 4,048 5,991 
RESET(**) 0,548 3,841 
Normality(***) 3,421 5,991 
Notes:(*) Regression of the squared residuals on Yˆ  and 2Yˆ (**) Regression of residuals on 
2Yˆ (***) Normality test (Jarque Bera) 
 
From the above table, it seems that model (2) (at 5% level of significance) is robust, 
for there is no heteroskedasticity, the specification is correct, the residuals are 
normally distributed, and finally there is no serial correlation. Hence, from table 2 it 
can be observed that at 5% level of significance DA has a negative impact on sh_ec 
although in a very small scale. In other words, in the Greek construction sector 
during the period 2008-2014 discretionary accruals do affect19 the percentage of 
shadow economy in GDP. Our research hypothesis is not accepted at level of 
significance 5%. 
 
Second, one can also estimate the impact of the capital tax rate on the above 
accruals, in period 2008-2012. 
 
The research hypothesis is: 
 
H0: Capital Tax Rate does not affect Discretionary Accruals of Greek construction 
Sector.  
                                                          
18 The diagnostic tests are based on  Halkos (2003) 
19 This effect however is small in practice 
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The model is: 
 
DAit = c0 + c1cap_taxit  +errorit                                                                               (3) 
 
Table 4. The results of Regression (3) 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant -50,766 0,0250 
Cap_Tax 6,696 0,0322 
R2 0,034 … 
Adjusted R2 0,017 … 
S.E. ofregression 19,151 … 
F-statistic 1,951 0,1681 
Durbin-Watsonstatistic 1,743 … 
 
It should be noted that, at 5% level of significance, dU=1,60754. Hence there is not 
serial correlation in model (3), since dU< DW <2. 
 
Histogram 3. The Distribution of Residuals of (3) 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 1 57
Observations 57
Mean      -0.340149
Median   0.017917
Maximum  51.68616
Minimum -48.29260
Std. Dev.   18.97603
Skewness  -0.025651
Kurtosis   4.191116
Jarque-Bera  3.375802
Probability  0.184907
 
 
Table 5. Robustness Tests of (3)20 
TESTS Panel EGLS (Cross-
section weights) 
Critical values 
(at 95%) 
Heteroskedasticity(*) 2,189 5,991 
RESET(**) 0,987 3,841 
Normality(***) 3,376 5,991 
Notes: (*) Regression of the squared residuals on Yˆ  and 2Yˆ  (**) Regression of residuals on 
2Yˆ (***) Normality test (Jarque Bera) 
                                                          
20 The diagnostic tests are based on  Halkos (2003) 
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From the above table 5, it seems that model (3) (at 5% level of significance) is 
robust, for there is no heteroskedasticity, the specification is correct, the residuals are 
normally distributed, and finally there is no serial correlation. Hence, from table 4 it 
can be observed that at 5% level of significance cap_tax has a positive impact on 
DA. In other words, in the Greek construction sector during the period 2008-
2012discretionary accruals (showing lower profits) increase in periods of higher 
capital tax rate.Our research hypothesis is not accepted at level of significance 5%. 
 
Third, from model (1) one can derive the useful information that usually large 
companies resort to earnings management more than the small ones21. This can be 
seen in table 8. This finding agrees with the findings of Guenther (1994).  This 
method can be used by the tax officers and the policy makers in order to estimate the 
tax avoidance in each company (not only in the construction sector, but also in any 
sector). 
 
Our research hypothesis is: 
 
H0: There is no correlation between the company size and the earnings management 
 
Table 6. Spearman Correlation between total DA (2008-2014) and average FA 
(2008-2014) 
  DA AverageFA 
DA 1   
      
AverageFA -0,785 1 
p-value 0,0025   
 
For each company of the sample total DA is created and average FA (average fixed 
assets for each company during the period 2008-2014). In table 6 it is observed that 
(at a level of significance 5%) there is a significantly negative correlation between 
the total DA and the average FA (p-value<5%). In other words, large companies 
resort to earnings management more than the small ones22. Our research hypothesis 
is not accepted at level of significance 5%. 
                                                          
21 It is made mainly by large companies that have well organized accounting department. 
Hence, large companies, compared to the small and medium firms (smes), are in a position 
to show a better picture in order to attract investors in the future. Consequently, in this case 
there is a distortion in market competition. Besides, it should not be ignored that smes face 
also two serious problems (shortage of experienced personnel and difficult access to finance) 
(Hamill, 1997). Thus, the big companies get even bigger while smes are gradually forced to 
leave the market. Consequently, market competition if further distorted. 
22 This distorts perfect competition at the cost of sme existence. Hence, large companies grow 
even bigger while smes bear the tax burden. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Econometric findings 
 
In this article it is found: a) that in the Greek construction sector discretionary 
accruals in practice affect negligibly the percentage of shadow economy in GDP, b) 
in the Greek construction sector discretionary accruals increase in periods of higher 
capital tax rate, and c) in the Greek construction sector large companies resort to 
earnings management more than the small ones. 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
In the present paper an attempt was made to estimate earnings management in a 
Greek sector. In fact, according to Tasios and Bekiaris, (2012) the quality of 
financial reports of Greek companies is of a poor quality. This is due mainly to 
earnings management, poor corporate governance, family ownership and not 
compliance with the accounting principles (Tasios and Bekiaris, 2012). 
 
However, it must be noticed that earnings management is not the only type of 
shadow economy. Hence, shadow economy should not be examined only by means 
of earning management estimation. This trigger further research going beyond the 
limits of the present paper. 
 
5.3 Enhancing the Model 
 
This model can be applied in all sectors of the economy, to enable policy makers as 
well as taxation officers to estimate earnings management in all country and take the 
appropriate measures. Perhaps some sectors use earnings management at a greater 
extent than others. This must be an available information to tax officers and policy 
makers. 
 
In this paper Jones model (1991) to estimate earnings management was used. One 
could further use more complicated and advanced models such as Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005).  
 
5.4 Policy Implications 
 
The earnings management is stronger in the bigger companies, since these 
companies have highly educated staff and in this way, they destroy market 
competition. It should be recalled that large companies compared to SMEs have 
easier access to finance. From the afore mentioned it becomes evident that SMEs 
will gradually be led to extinction. Governments should not hesitate to adopt 
international accounting and auditing standards to eliminate shadow economy, part 
of which is earnings management. 
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According to the Jones (1991) model, tax officers can spot the tax evading 
companies. Even in the case in which earnings management estimated values are not 
100% correct, they are still an indicator and give a direction towards the elimination 
of shadow economy. 
International accounting and auditing standards must be internationally adopted. One 
should bear in mind that countries, having robust accounting systems and high levels 
of transparency, enjoy economic growth and political stability (Georgiou et al., 
2015; Rogdaki et al., 2011; Bekiaris et al., 2011). In fact, the international adoption 
of international accounting standards will foster company profitability and 
eventually cause economic growth (Chen et al., 2010; Leblond, 2011; Ponomareva 
and Melnikova, 2015; Tarca et al., 2013; Yu and Wahid, 2014; Zeff, 2010). 
 
References:  
 
Allingham, M.G., Sandmo, A. 1972. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of  
Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338. 
Armbrecht, J., Carlback, M. 2011. The Shadow Economy: Its Effects on the Competition in  
the Swedish Restaurant Industry. Tourism in an Era of Uncertainty Rhodes Island, 
Greece 27–30 Apri 26. 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D. Hayn, C. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings  
expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33,173-204. 
Bekiaris, M., Sgouros, T. and Tasios, S. 2011. Financial Reporting Quality in Greece: A  
Case Study of Auditor’s Qualifications. University of the Aegean, Conference for 
the 25 Years of the Business Administration Department, SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447613. 
Brondolo, J. 2009. Collecting Taxes During an Economic Crisis: Challenges and Policy  
Options. IMF Working Paper, July 14. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0917.pdf 
Cahan, S.F. 1992. The Effect of Antitrust Investigations on Discretionary Accruals. A  
Refined Test of the Political Cost Hypothesis. The Accounting Review, 67, 77-95. 
Chen, H., Tang, Q., Jiang, Y. & Lin, Z. 2010. The role of international financial reporting  
standards in accounting quality: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of 
International Financial Management & Accounting, 21(3), 220-278.   
Cohen, D.A., Dey, Α. and Lys, Τ.Ζ. 2004. Trends in earnings management and in  
formativeness of earnings announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley 
Periods. Working paper, Northwestern University, November. 
Cormier, D. Magnan, M. & Morard, B. 2000. The contractual and value relevance of  
reported earnings in a dividend-focused environment. European Accounting 
Review, 9(3), 387-417. 
D’Souza, J., Jacob, J. & Ramesh, K. 2001. The use of accounting flexibility to reduce labor  
renegotiation costs and manage earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30, 
187-208. 
DeAngelo, L. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of  
Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review, 61, 400-
420. 
EIOPA, 2015. Financial Stability Report.  
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/Financial_Stability_Report_May_2015
.pdf 
  I. Gasteratos, M. Karamalis, A. Koutoupis, I. Filos 
 
15 
Estrin, S. & Mickiewicz, T. 2012. Shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry. Review of  
Development Economics, 16(4), 559-578. 
Filip, A., Raffournier, B. 2015. The Impact of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis on Earnings  
Management: The European Evidence. https://business.illinois.edu/zimmerman/wp-
content/uploads/sites/56/2015/08/023-Filip.pdf 
Georgiou, M., Kyriazis, N. and Economou, E.M.L. 2015. Democracy, Political Stability and  
Economic Performance. A Panel Data Analysis. Journal of Risk & Control, 2(1 1-
18.   
Georgiou, M.N. 2013a. The Impact of Shadow Economy on the Stock Market Volatility. A  
Worldwide Panel Data Analysis. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354369.  
Georgiou, M.N. 2013b. Shadow Economy Hinders Entrepreneurship. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358005 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2358005  
Georgiou, M.N. 2013c. Income Distribution and Shadow Economy. A Worldwide Panel  
Data Analysis. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2357401 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2357401.  
Georgiou, M.N. 2016. Introducing A Shadow Economy Indicator. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2801547. 
Godfrey, J., Mather, P. & Ramsay, A. 2003. Earnings and Impression Management in  
Financial Reports. The Case of CEO Changes. Abacus, 39(1), 95-123. 
Guenther, D.A. 1994. Earnings Management in Response to Corporate Tax Rate Changes:  
Evidence from the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The Accounting Review, 69(1), 230-243. 
Hamill, J. 1997. The internet and international marketing. International Marketing Review,  
14(5), 300-323. 
ICAEW 2010. International Consistency. Available at:  
https://media.nasba.org/files/2011/04/InternationalConsistency-Hodgkinson.pdf 
Jones, J. 1991. Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of  
Accounting Research 29, 193-228. 
Kang, S.H. and Sivaramakrishnan, K. 1995. Issues in testing earnings management and an  
instrumental variable approach. Journal of Accounting Research, 33. 353–367.  
Kerr, J.N. 2015. Transparency, Information Shocks, and Tax Avoidance. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2761140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2761140 
Kim, J.B. Li, Y. & Zhang, L. 2011. Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm- 
level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 639-662. 
Kothari, S.P., Leone, A.J. & Wasley, C.E. 2005. Performance-matched discretionary accrual  
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 163-197.  
Leblond, P. 2011. EU, US and international accounting standards: A delicate balancing act in  
governing global finance. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(3), 443-461.    
Leuz, C. 2010. Different approaches to corporate reporting regulation: How jurisdictions  
differ and why. Accounting and Business Research, 40(3) (Special Issue), 229-256. 
Liebhafsky, H.H. 1968. The Nature of Price Theory. The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois. 
Mazhar, U. & Méon, P.G. 2012. Taxing the unobservable: The impact of the shadow  
economy on inflation and taxation. Working Papers CEB, 12. 
Ponomareva, S.V. & Melnikova, A.S. 2015. Financial Instruments Reflected by  
Organizations in Accordance with International Standards of Financial Accounting 
of Public Sector. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 6(3 S3), 213. 
Reitenga, A.L. & Tearney, M.G. 2003. Mandatory CEO Retirements, Discretionary Accruals  
and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance, 82(2), 255-280. 
     Earnings Management in Greece: A Case Study in Construction Sector Using Jones 
Model  
16 
Rogdaki, E.  Koutoupis, A.G. and Rodosthenous, M. 2011. Ensuring the "True and Fair View  
Principle" of Banks’ Financial Statements after the Introduction of the Application 
of IFRS: The Case of Greece. European  ResearchStudies, 14(3). 
Rovolis, A., Liapis, K., Spilioti, S. 2014.  A Capital Structure Financial Analysis and  
Unmeasured Effect of each Countries Regime: the Real Estate Companies (REITS). 
International Journal of Economics and Business Administration, 2(3), 57-71. 
Schneider, F. 2012. The shadow economy and work in the shadow: What do we (not) know?   
IZA, DP no. 6423, Bonn, Germany.   
Schneider, F. 2013. Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European and 5  
other OECD Countries from 2003 to 2013: A Further Decline. Johannes Kepler 
Universität, Linz, 5–7.   
Schneider, F. & Enste, D. 2000. Shadow Economies around the World Size, Causes, and  
Consequences. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1).   
Schneider, F., Buehn, A. and Montenegro, E.C. 2010. New Estimates for the Shadow  
Economies all over the World. International Economic Journal, 24(4), 443-461. 
Srinivasan, T.N. 1973. Tax evasion: A model. Journal of Public Economics, 2(4), 339-346.  
Tarca, A., Morris, R.D. & Moy, M. 2013. An investigation of the relationship between use of  
international accounting standards and source of company finance in Germany. 
Abacus, 49(1), 74-98. 
Tasios, S. & Bekiaris, M. 2012. Auditor's perceptions of financial reporting quality: The  
case of Greece. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(1), 
57. 
Tsamis, A., Liapis, K. 2014. Fair Value and Cost Accounting, Depreciation Methods,  
Recognition and Measurement for Fixed Assets. International Journal of Economics 
and Business Administration, 2(3), 115-133. 
Vanasco, R.R. 1998. Fraud auditing. Managerial Auditing Journal, 13(1), 4-71. 
Weber, D. 2006. Book-tax differences, analysts’ forecast errors, and stock returns. Working  
paper, University of Connecticut.   
Yu, G. & Wahid, A.S. 2014. Accounting standards and international portfolio holdings. The  
Accounting Review, 89(5), 1895-1930.   
Zeff, S.A. 2010. Political lobbying on accounting standards–US, UK and international  
experience. Comparative international accounting, 11, 247-278.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
